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ABSTRACT:  This  paper  argues  that  the 
conflicts that afflicted the Western Balkan 
region in the 1990s pushed the countries 
into  the  European  ‘super-periphery’, 
characterised  by  deindustrialisation  and 
high  unemployment,  ethnic  and  regional 
fragmentation,  political  turmoil,  and 
instability.  Integration  into  international 
trade  has  been  disrupted,  leading  to 
chronic  balance  of  payments  deficits. 
Low  inflows  of  international  capital, 
due  to  high  country  risk,  have  hindered 
technological  catch-up  and  weakened 
international  competitiveness.  An 
unattractive  environment  for  productive 
entrepreneurship  has  created  barriers  to 
the entry of SMEs, and at the same time 
large informal economies. Several countries 
have  become  labour-export  economies, 
with significant outflows of skilled labour. 
Economic development follows a low-skill 
growth path. The current global economic 
crisis  is  having  a  further  deleterious 
effect  as  export  revenues,  foreign  direct 
investment,  and  labour  remittances  all 
diminish.  Furthermore,  as  transition  has 
proceeded,  disparities  between  capital 
cities  and  rural  areas  have  increased, 
while weak administrative capacities have 
hindered  the  implementation  of  effective 
local  development  policies  to  counteract 
these effects. Endogenous local development 
cannot  provide  an  alternative  to  greater 
engagement with the global economy. The 
conclusion is that the countries of the region 
have  been  left  out  of  the  most  beneficial 
elements  of  the  globalisation  process, 
while  simultaneously  suffering  from  its 
main defects. Without a faster process of 
accession  to  the  EU,  local  disparities  are 
likely to widen, and the region may remain 
within  the  European  super-periphery  for 
the foreseeable future.
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In the last half of the twentieth century, the economies of South East Europe 
had different historical experiences of connection to the global economy. While 
former Yugoslavia was relatively open and internationally integrated, Albania was 
almost completely isolated, setting a context for subsequent weak integration into 
international markets. Globalisation typically impacts on transition economies 
by connecting their emerging capital markets, labour markets and tradable goods 
markets to the international economy. The path of transition in the Yugoslav 
successor states was rather different. After the break up of Yugoslavia, with the 
exception of Slovenia, they became quite isolated from global markets due to wars 
in Croatia in 1991 and in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992-1995. International 
sanctions imposed purposeful isolation on Serbia and Montenegro, including 
Kosovo. In the south, Greek trade embargoes against Macedonia in a dispute 
over the country’s name effectively isolated it for many years1. It was not until 
the democratic changes in Croatia and Serbia in 2000 that the region began once 
again to engage with the global market in any meaningful way. During the 1990s 
the flows of goods and services to the global market were disrupted, as were capital 
inflows with the exception of aid inflows after the Bosnia and Kosovo wars. Even 
after 2000, a severe civil conflict in Macedonia in 2001 continued to disrupt its 
integration into global markets. All this has impacted on local economies. While 
capital cities and larger urban areas have managed the reintegration process 
well, smaller towns and rural areas have found it more difficult to re-establish 
connectedness with the global economy.
Among the countries of what has come to be known as the Western Balkan2 region, 
engagement with globalisation began soonest in Croatia. After a banking crisis in 
1998, a large part of the banking sector was effectively sold off to foreign banks from 
Italy and Austria. This marked a turning point, as low-cost capital began to flow 
into the country. Tourism began to increase as a source of international revenue, 
and within a few years tourist numbers had recovered to pre-1990 levels. Tourism 
also began to develop significantly in Montenegro after it gained independence 
in 2006. In other countries, banks gradually came under international control. 
Foreign investment in sectors such as oil refining and telecommunications began 
to increase. After 2000 also, the EU became more engaged in the region, and the 
Europeanisation of policy and economic strategy began to replace independent 
1  The country was admitted to the United Nations in 1993 under the provisional name of the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. For brevity, in this paper I refer to the country name 
as ‘Macedonia’. 
2  These are the group of seven countries in South East Europe which have not yet joined the 
EU. They are Albania, and the successor states of former Yugoslavia: Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia.Economic Development in the Western Balkans
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national economic development programmes. A huge inflow of international 
assistance was accompanied by international policy advisers and consultants who 
engaged in wholesale policy transfer which dramatically affected national and 
local policy approaches to issues such as the development of the small business 
sector, innovation policies, and regional policy3. This process of policy transfer 
was hardly consistent, however, reflecting the different views of uncoordinated 
advisers. International aid coordination units were established in most countries, 
but overall the policy transfer effort has been relatively ineffective in many areas, 
especially at the level of local economic development where policy coordination 
has been even more difficult than at national level.
Following the end of the Kosovo war, and the democratic changes in Croatia and 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in 2000, the Western 
Balkan economies entered a period of more or less sustained recovery. Economic 
growth was relatively strong compared to performance over the previous decade, 
averaging around 4 per cent per annum from 2000-06. Average growth of real 
GDP increased further to 6 per cent in 2007, before falling back to around 4.5 per 
cent in 2008. Yet, despite this recent economic growth, the region still includes 
some of the poorest countries in Europe. In 2006, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) 
had the lowest income per capita, while Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, and 
Serbia were only slightly better off. Croatia was better placed, with more than 
three times the income per capita of BiH, and above new member states such as 
Slovakia and Poland. 
The relatively low levels of income per capita and GDP per capita in the Western 
Balkans countries show that, with the partial exception of Croatia, these countries 
belong  to  what  Martin  Sokol  has  termed  the  European  ‘super-periphery’ 
(Sokol 2001). While the new EU member states from East Europe, along with 
other outlying countries such as Greece and Portugal, may be considered the 
periphery of Europe in relation to the core states, the gap between these and 
the poor countries of the Balkan region and other countries further east is so 
great that they form a super-periphery characterised by ‘political turmoil and 
instability…[a] catastrophic economic situation, social polarization, ethnic and 
regional fragmentation.’ (Sokol, 2001: 651). These countries furthermore have 
great difficulty in connecting to the global economy.
3  For a study of the impact of policy transfer on local economic development in Montenegro 
see Bartlett (2006), and for the impact on social welfare policies in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
see Deacon and Stubbs (1998).24
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Figure 1
Source: EBRD online data 2008
The rest of this paper analyses the main barriers to economic development in the 
Western Balkan states, and the key dimensions of their super-peripheral status. 
Section 1 sets the context by showing the impact of transition, break-up and war 
on the industrial base of the region, and how this has led to high unemployment 
and poverty. Section 2 the shows how globalisation has bypassed the region, with 
a lack of competitiveness on international markets leading to large balance of 
payments deficits, while low inflows of international capital have been unable to 
prevent a build up of international debt, and an adverse impact on technological 
capacity of enterprises and on the skill levels of the labour force. In the absence 
of sufficient foreign investment inflows, economic development in the region has 
depended very much on the mobilisation of endogenous resources and the entry of 
new small firms. However, as discussed in section 3, the institutional framework 
has been inimical to the entry and growth of SMEs and entrepreneurial impulses 
have been channelled into the informal economy. Section 4 shows how local and 
regional disparities have emerged, as capital cities have fared better than other 
areas. The section questions whether there is sufficient local potential of skilled 
labour,  entrepreneurial  culture,  capital  resources,  and  institutional  capacity 
to implement desirable strategies of endogenous local economic development. Economic Development in the Western Balkans
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Section 4 concludes with an emphasis on the importance of the EU accession 
process for the integration of the region into the global economy.
1. DE-INDUSTRIALISATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT
The severity of the economic collapse in the first phase of transition was reflected in 
a steep collapse of industrial output. The decline was initiated by the stabilization 
programme  in  former  Yugoslavia,  and  the  collapse  of  the  central  planning 
system in Albania, even prior to the break-up of Yugoslavia and the armed 
conflicts of the early 1990s (Bartlett 2008). Deindustrialization was most severe 
in Albania where industrial production dropped by half between 1989 and 1991. 
In Macedonia, BiH and Serbia and Montenegro, industrial production declined 
by around a quarter over the two years. In Croatia industrial production fell by 
11 percent between 1989 and 1990, before the onset of the war on its territory 
in 1991, which naturally worsened the decline. By the end of 1991, industrial 
production in Croatia had fallen by even more than in the other successor states, 
and the local areas most affected by the war have remained in a chronic state of 
economic and social collapse (IMC 2004). 
Figure 2: Industrial output index, 1985–2003 (1989 = 100)
Sources: Derived from UNECE Economic Survey of Europe 1999(1) and 2004(2)26
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Between 1992 and 1995, industrial production continued to fall by a further 
third in Albania and Macedonia. In FRY where industrial production had fallen 
to only one-third of its earlier level, the continuing slump was worsened by the 
imposition of UN sanctions. In BiH, all-out warfare led to a complete collapse 
of industrial capacity, and by 1994 industrial production had practically ceased 
altogether. 
The subsequent recoveries were also very different. By 2003, Croatia and Macedonia 
had  recovered  most,  with  industrial  production  in  Croatia  at  two-thirds  of 
its previous level and on an upward trajectory, while in Macedonia industrial 
production  stagnated  at  around  half  its  previous  level.  Albanian  industrial 
production never recovered from the shock of transition, and stagnated at just 
over one quarter of its previous level. In Serbia and Montenegro, the incipient 
recovery was set back by the NATO bombing campaign of 1999. In BiH industrial 
production was still only 14 per cent of the 1989 level by 2003. The legacy has been 
that large areas of severe deprivation and poverty can be found in many parts 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, north-east Montenegro, southern Serbia, north-east 
Macedonia, and almost the whole of Kosovo outside of Pristina.
Labour force adjustment has been a difficult aspect of the transition process in 
the successor states, which inherited a set of employment laws that protected 
incumbent workers and led to low rates of labour force turnover. Workers who lost 
their jobs through restructuring or privatization found it hard to find new jobs. 
Unemployment has had a pronounced regional dimension with some localities 
experiencing intense economic decline, with many unemployment black-spots.4 
In Albania the transition was marked by a sudden increase in unemployment due 
to weak job protection following the collapse of central planning.
Table 1.  Unemployment rates, 1997–2007 (%)
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Albania 14.9 18.4 16.4 15.2 14.2 13.3
Croatia 9.9 13.5 15.8 14.3 12.3  8.3
Macedonia 36.0 32.4 30.5 36.7 37.3 34.2
Serbia and Montenegro 13.8 13.7 12.8 15.2 - -
–Serbia - - 12.2 14.6 20.8 18.1
–Montenegro 23.5 27.3 24.8 - 30.5 26.4
Kosovo - - 57.1 49.7 41.4 -
4  On regional disparities in Serbia see Arandarenko (2006), on Montenegro (Bartlett 2006), 
and on Eastern Slavonia (IMC 2004).Economic Development in the Western Balkans
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Source: Labour Force Survey data for Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, Serbia, and Macedonia; for 
Kosovo, based on LSMS survey data, Labour Market Statistics 2005, Statistical Office of Kosovo, 
Prishtina; household survey data for Montenegro (1996-2001) from Montenegro Economic Trends, 
12, ISSP Podgorica; official registered unemployment data for Albania, INSTAT, Tirana; EBRD 
online database 2008
Unemployment in the Yugoslav successor states has remained high up to the 
present. In Kosovo it is at a disastrously high level at over 40 per cent, followed 
closely by Macedonia at 34 per cent, while in BiH, the unemployment rate was 
22 per cent in 2004. In Serbia and Montenegro, the unemployment rate began to 
increase in 2001 as institutional reforms led to lay-offs associated with enterprise 
restructuring, and in Serbia wide regional disparities in unemployment emerged 
(Arandarenko 2006). In Albania, a combination of economic growth and mass 
emigration reduced the rate of unemployment to 13 per cent by 2007. In Croatia, 
the unemployment rate in 2007 was just over eight per cent, having fallen for 
several years as economic growth began to create jobs, although this has begun 
to increase again due to the impact of the current global economic crisis.
Furthermore, there is high proportion of long-term unemployed people and this 
has led to the deterioration of the skills base of sections of the labour force. The 
share of the unemployed who had been out of work for more than one year in 2002 
reached 85 per cent in Macedonia and Montenegro, and 72 per cent in Serbia. 
Studies of labour market flows in the region have found very low rates of exit from 
unemployment to formal sector employment even in Croatia (Crnković-Pozaić 
2005). The loss of skills due to long-term unemployment presents a challenge to 
policy makers seeking to reintegrate the unemployed into the labour market.
Widespread poverty
The isolation of the region from the processes of globalisation has led to an 
extraordinary increase in the poverty of the populations. In 2002, as many as 70 
per cent of the Albanian population were poor, on a poverty line of $4.30 a day, 
as were 42 per cent in Serbia and Montenegro, 35 per cent in BiH, and 24 per 
cent in Macedonia (World Bank 2005a). In Albania, poverty is most severe in 
the rural areas (World Bank 2003a). In the northern mountain areas, over two-
fifths of the population live in absolute poverty. The neglect of infrastructure and 
services in rural areas has stimulated migration to the cities, where shanty towns 
and illegal housing have grown up, while about one-fifth of the population has 
emigrated. In Kosovo, over one-third of the population live below a poverty line 
of €1.42 per day and about 15 per cent of the population live in extreme poverty 28
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with insufficient income to cover basic food needs (World Bank 2005b). In Serbia, 
household surveys carried out in 2002 showed 800,000 people living in poverty 
(GoS 2004). Poverty has become a rural phenomenon, as incomes in the rural areas 
have not kept pace with urban wages. In Montenegro a survey carried out in 2000 
showed at least one-fifth of the population living in poverty (UNDP 2003). The 
north-east part of the country is even more affected due to deindustrialization 
and the collapse of the traditional wood processing and papermaking industries 
(Bartlett 2006). In BiH, a household survey carried out in 2001 revealed that one 
quarter of the population in Republika Srpska, and one-sixth of the population in 
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, live in absolute poverty, while fewer 
live in poverty in the more developed Croat-populated areas. In BiH as a whole, 
about half the population live below or close to poverty (World Bank 2003b). 
In Macedonia, poverty household budget surveys show about one-fifth of all 
households living below the poverty line (GoM 2002) with a rural location being 
a significant indicator of poverty risk. In Croatia household budget surveys show 
that absolute poverty affects mainly the long-term unemployed and people living 
in war-affected areas. 
2. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS
Following the break-up of Yugoslavia the successor states lost ground in traditional 
export markets, and in the 1990s all the Western Balkan countries had a dismal 
export performance, while BiH experienced a near total collapse of trade due 
to the war. Sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro caused a steep decline in 
their trade with the outside world. In 2000, the EU granted autonomous trade 
preferences to the Western Balkan countries, dismantling import tariffs and 
duties for almost all their exports. Exports increased sharply, more than doubling 
in the cases of Albania, BiH, and Serbia and Montenegro. By 2005, exports per 
capita had reached $2,300 in Croatia, $1,600 in Serbia, $1,150 in Macedonia, but 
were far lower in BiH ($641) and Albania ($231).
All the countries of the region have a relatively low ratio of exports of goods and 
services to GDP. Croatia and Macedonia have export ratios of around 40 per cent 
of GDP reflecting their better relationship to the EU markets as candidate states. 
Albania, BiH, and Serbia and Montenegro have export ratios below 30 per cent 
of GDP. The worst performance was in BiH, whose share of exports in GDP has 
actually fallen. Economic Development in the Western Balkans
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Figure 3
Source: World Bank online database 2006
Measures to boost exports through improving international competitiveness have 
been high up on the policy agenda. Unfortunately this is more easily said than 
done. The policy actions required to increase competitiveness involve structural 
reforms such as improving conditions for the entry of new firms, improving 
the supply response of existing firms through privatization or foreign direct 
investment, improving labour productivity through improved education and 
training, and ensuring unit labour costs are in line with competitors and export 
market conditions. These structural reforms are often resisted by interest groups 
that would prefer to maintain the status quo.
Table 2. Current Account Deficits (% GDP)
Croatia Macedonia Albania BiH
FRY  
(Serbia and 
Montenegro)
Average 1996-09 -7.7 -6.0 -8.8 -25.6 -6.2
Average 2000-05 -5.3 -5.7 -7.5 -19.3 -8.5
Source: EBRD Transition Report 200530
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Owing to their relatively poor export performance the Western Balkan economies 
all have persistent current account deficits, despite income from tourism and 
emigrants’ remittances. BiH has the largest current account deficit which has been 
covered by donor financial assistance. In order to reduce their external deficits 
governments have adopted expenditure-reducing policies, cutting government 
budget deficits in order to restrain domestic demand, with the aim of reducing 
the growth of imports. 
Low inflows of international capital
Although inflows of FDI to the Western Balkans have increased in recent years, 
Croatia has been the main beneficiary, while inflows into Albania, BiH, Kosovo, 
and Macedonia have been relatively trivial. Much of the FDI inflow to the region 
has been linked to privatization in telecommunications, banking and oil refining 
rather than new green field investments, and the pattern of inflow over time has 
been irregular and lumpy, following the vagaries of the privatization process. 
Figure 4
Source: UNCTAD online FDI database 2008
The Western Balkan states have introduced numerous measures to make their 
economies more attractive to foreign investors. Various agencies to promote Economic Development in the Western Balkans
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foreign investment have been established5 with the most effective in Croatia and 
Serbia (OECD 2007: 62). Numerous tax exemptions have been introduced to 
attract foreign investment6, and the region now has some of the lowest corporate 
tax rates in Europe, averaging 16 per cent in 2007 compared to an average of 25 
per cent in the EU (OECD 2007: 74). Free economic zones have been established 
in some countries, and in Croatia, nineteen such zones exempt businesses from 
normal taxes and customs procedures. Although laws on foreign investment 
aiming to give equal treatment to foreign and domestic investors have been 
introduced,7  administrative  barriers  continue  to  slow  FDI  inflows.  Even  in 
Croatia, foreign investors have found it difficult to complete transactions in the 
tourism and construction sectors (OECD 2007: 48). Despite these efforts, the low 
inflows of foreign direct investment have not been able to bridge the balance of 
payments deficit on the current account and have led to a correspondingly large 
build up of international indebtedness. 
Croatia has the highest level of external debt to GDP, and is the only country 
in which this ratio has increased in recent years. It also has a relatively high 
debt-service ratio and low international reserves, and is therefore vulnerable to 
external shocks from the current global financial crisis (Vlahinic-Dizdarevic et 
al. 2006). Serbia also has high levels of external indebtedness, but on a downward 
trend. The other countries have moderate and falling debt-to-GDP ratios. High 
international indebtedness implies reliance on inflows of international assistance 
or foreign investment. However, foreign direct investment in the region has been 
relatively low and, as indicated above, mainly related to privatisation. 
5  The investment promotion agencies are Albinvest, the Foreign Investment Promotion Agency 
in BiH, the Trade and Investment Promotion Agency in Croatia, the Agency for Foreign 
Investments of the Republic of Macedonia, the Montenegrin Investment promotion Agency, 
and the Serbia Investment and Export Promotion Agency.
6  These have included a 5 year corporate tax exemption for foreign subsidiaries in BiH, and for 
3 years in Macedonia, while tax exemptions are available in Free Zones and in less developed 
regions in Croatia. 
7  In Albania, the Law on Foreign Investments (1993); in BiH the Law on the Policy of Foreign 
Direct Investments (1998); in Croatia the Investment Promotion Act (2000); in Macedonia, 
the Constitution and the Law on Trading Companies (2004); in Montenegro, the Law on 
Foreign Investments (2000); and in Serbia, the Law on Foreign Investments (2002).32
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Figure 5: External debt to GDP ratio, 2002 & 2005 (% GDP)
Source: EBRD 2007 online data
Delayed technological catch-up
Former Yugoslavia began the transition in the late 1980s in a favourable position 
as the most advanced and most open of the communist states. It had a highly 
skilled workforce in industries that traded intensively with the EU. However this 
favourable position disguised large internal differences between more and less 
developed regions. Slovenia and Croatia in the north were far more advanced than 
Macedonia and Kosovo in the south. Therefore when the country broke up, the 
more advanced regions were able to integrate themselves into the global economy 
more easily. The experience of Slovenia demonstrates how this process can enable 
a country to progress and develop on the basis of upskilling its workforce, and 
integrate into the EU on the basis of high-skill industry specialisations (such as 
in motor car components manufacturing). Croatia was in a position to follow the 
example set by Slovenia, but the war period set the country back and many of its 
industries lost their connections with the global economy. The development and 
technology gap between Croatia and Slovenia has therefore widened. The gap is 
even more pronounced in the other successor states of former Yugoslavia which 
had weaker initial conditions. Albania also began the transition from a low level 
of economic development, and with a poor endowment of skills.Economic Development in the Western Balkans
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These considerations suggest that there is nothing automatic about the Western 
Balkan countries becoming immersed in the process of skill-biased technical 
change. They may follow two feasible paths: a high technology path and a low 
technology path. Along the first path, favourable initial conditions followed by a 
speedy restructuring combined with preservation and growth of human capital 
may lead to a rapid recovery and growth catch-up with the EU economic average. 
This can be seen in the case of Slovenia. The second path, typical of countries 
in the super-periphery, is characterised by unfavourable initial conditions and 
political instability leading to a slow pace of transition and restructuring. Along 
this  path,  deindustrialisation  and  mass  unemployment  is  prolonged,  leading 
to deskilling and the loss of human capital through the emigration of skilled 
workers. Countries that follow this path have weak demand for skilled labour, 
and specialise in export of low-skill goods. They are less likely to attract FDI, 
partly due to the weakness of the skills base of the labour force, and this in turn 
may undermine the process of skill upgrading.
Figure 6
Source: Eurostat Statistics in Focus 1/2005 “External trade of the Western Balkan Countries” (Own 
calculations – for details of classification scheme see Appendix)
The evidence that the Western Balkan countries are following a low-skill path of 
transition is strong. Croatia is the only exception. Overall, most exports from the 
region to the EU-25 consist of low-skill or medium-skill goods. Just under two-34
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fifths of exports are low-skill goods, and just over two-fifths are medium-skill 
goods. Albania, BiH, and Macedonia export predominantly goods with a low-
skill content to the EU-25. Serbia and Montenegro export the highest share of 
medium-skill goods, while Croatia exports the highest share of high-skill goods. 
Overall, only one-fifth of exports are high-skill goods, of which almost three-
quarters originate in Croatia.
Figure 7
Source: International Telecommunications Union; Internet host data: Network Wizards, RIPE. 
There  are  substantial  differences  in  technological  level  among  the  Western 
Balkan countries, with Albania and Macedonia being far behind in their level 
of technological development. Several governments have indicated their desire 
to facilitate the transfer of technology from their domestic science base to the 
enterprise sector, rather than relying exclusively on technology transfer from 
abroad. Technology parks have been established to encourage the transfer of 
knowledge from universities to private business. However, these policies are still 
in an embryonic stage and lag far behind the comprehensive set of measures that 
have been used to promote technological development in Slovenia (Bartlett and 
Cučković, 2006).Economic Development in the Western Balkans
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3. ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE ENTRY OF NEW FIRMS
Owing to the relatively slow pace of privatization and the weakness of inward 
investment into most of the Western Balkan countries, the economic development 
of the region has been highly reliant on the performance and vitality of domestic 
entrepreneurs who have created new small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). 
These new entrepreneurial businesses have been a main source of job creation 
for workers who have lost their jobs in the declining social-ownership and state-
ownership sectors. They have introduced a critical element of competition and 
dynamism into these post-conflict economies, challenging established monopolies 
and  the  powerful  coalitions  which  have  sought  to  maintain  their  privileged 
positions gained during the chaos of transition, war, and civil conflict. 
In the early 1990s the Western Balkans experienced a rapid entry of new small 
businesses in the private sector, despite significant obstacles due to lack of finance, 
adverse government regulation and taxation policies, and the market dominance 
of large enterprises. However, entry rates slowed down in the late 1990s, and the 
new entrepreneurs faced many obstacles to developing their businesses. A key 
obstacle was lack of finance as local banks channelled credits mainly to the large 
enterprise sector, while loans to small enterprises were provided at high interest 
rates with large collateral requirements. Due to capital scarcity, relatively few 
small businesses were able to grow into competitive medium sized enterprises, 
and the development of the SME sector was held back. Larger firms attempted 
to establish and maintain dominant or monopoly positions, making use of their 
close connections to the economic and political elites, which themselves rotated 
between positions of political and economic power. The convergence of these 
interests enabled the large enterprise sector to establish and maintain monopoly 
positions, and to influence economic policy in ways inimical to the development 
of a competitive small business sector. Thus, there was relatively little policy 
impetus for the promotion of the SME sector in most of the Western Balkan 
states for many years. 
After the democratic changes in 2000, an influx of foreign assistance began to ease 
the financial constraints facing SMEs. The institutional framework was heavily 
influenced by international aid donors, who saw the SME sector as a key element 
in reconstruction. Microfinance banks were established to mobilize financial 
resources for small businesses, supported by the EBRD and other international 
donors and often with a social motivation to reduce poverty, targeting socially 
disadvantaged  groups  including  women,  refugees,  and  internally  displaced 
persons. However, the microfinance institutions were too limited to be a solution 36
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to the credit gaps facing small businesses. Although a significant number of new 
jobs were created, and many people were offered a route out of poverty, high 
unemployment persisted, and the impact on overall economic performance was 
limited. Yet, despite the entry of new enterprises, the density of SMEs remains very 
low in Serbia, Montenegro and Albania, and somewhat higher in BiH, Croatia, 
and Macedonia. All however are well below the average for neighbouring EU 
countries such as Bulgaria, Greece, and Slovenia. 
Figure 8: Density of SMEs (per 1,000 population)
Source: International Finance Corporation, July 2006 and SME Observatory of the Republic of 
Macedonia, Report 2004 (October 2005).
In addition to the entry of new limited liability companies, many new businesses 
have been set up by self-employed entrepreneurs. In the former Yugoslav countries 
the tradition of the independent sole proprietor played an important role in this. 
Due to the lower cost of entry, the sector has seen rapid growth. Even though 
these are typically small firms with few employees, they have a tradition of skilled 
work, and are important in preserving and developing skills, and providing a 
source of demand for skilled labour.Economic Development in the Western Balkans
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Table 3.  Self employed employers and own-account workers (% of all in work)
Self-employed 
employers
Own-account self-employed 
workers
Albania (2001) 6.0 48.0
Croatia (2006) 8.0 23.0
Macedonia (2003) 8.0 -
Sources: Labour Force Survey, Republic of Macedonia State Statistical Office, April 2003, p. 50; 
Labour Force in the Republic of Croatia First Half-year 2006, First Release, 9.2.7/1, State Statistical 
Office of Croatia. People and Work in Albania, INSTAT, 2004 (data refer to 2001).
The number of sole proprietors has increased rapidly in all the Western Balkan 
countries, whether setting up as craft firms, ‘private shops’, self-employed or 
small traders. Two main factors drive this growth. The first is poverty, which 
pushes unemployed or marginalized people into self-employment in easy-to-enter 
sectors such as trade with little prospect of capital accumulation and growth. 
The second is the response to new opportunities which pull entrepreneurial 
individuals into dynamic segments of the economy (Bartlett and Hoggett 1996). 
Studies  in  other  transition  contexts  has  shown  that  the  ‘self-employed  with 
employees’ are more likely to be dynamic and upwardly mobile entrepreneurs, 
while self-employed individuals working on their own account are more likely 
to be struggling to make ends meet (Earle and Sakova 2000; Hanley 2000). Both 
types can be observed in the Western Balkans where, due to high unemployment 
and weak social security systems, many vulnerable people are pushed into self-
employment as a means to ensure a living, while there are also many other cases 
of entrepreneurial individuals who have been drawn into self-employment by the 
new market opportunities opened up by economic liberalization. Table 3 shows 
that Albania has a greater proportion of self-employed people subject to ‘push’ 
factors than Croatia and Macedonia, although the similar proportions of ‘self-
employed with employees’ attests to the strong pull factors at work encouraging 
the self-employed to create jobs. 
The informal economy, which comprises both private unregistered firms and 
undeclared  work  in  registered  firms,  is  widespread  since  many  employers 
avoid  paying  social  insurance  contributions.  The  lack  of  job  creation  in  the 
formal sector has pushed unemployed people into informal activity to make 
a  subsistence  income,  while  employers  have  embraced  informality  to  avoid 
restrictive regulations. Lack of trust in formal institutions also plays an important 
role. Entrepreneurs in BiH are more likely to base their business dealings on the 
‘strong ties’ of interpersonal trust with known business partners in the informal 38
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economy, than on the ‘weak ties’ of institutional trust in anonymous business 
partners in the formal economy (Rus and Iglić 2005). Albania has the highest 
estimated share of informal economic activity, with 52 per cent of household 
income undeclared, while Kosovo and Macedonia also have a high share, at 45 
per cent and 39 per cent respectively (Christie and Holzner 2004) while Serbia 
and Croatia have the lowest levels at 18-19 per cent. Informal activity has a strong 
geographical component, being higher in the south of the region than in the 
north, and is associated with the level of economic development.
In  recent  years  new  legislation  has  reduced  barriers  to  business  entry  and 
improved the investment climate in several countries. Business simplification task 
forces have been established in Croatia and Macedonia, while in BiH a ‘Bulldozer 
Commission’ was set up in 2003 to sweep away restrictive legislation. Albania 
adopted a detailed action plan aimed at reducing the administrative barriers to 
investments which led to a decrease in the average number of days needed to 
register a business. According to a recent European Commission report ‘company 
registration time in the Western Balkans is, on average, not altogether worse 
from what one finds in some Member States and candidate countries’ (European 
Commission 2004: 11). Surveys carried out by the World Bank covering limited 
liability companies based in capital cities have enabled a ranking of the ‘ease of 
doing business’ in different countries. 
Table 4.  Ease of Doing Business Rank
Austria 27
Hungary 41
Bulgaria 45
Romania 47
Slovenia 54
Macedonia 71
Albania 86
Montenegro 90
Serbia 94
Greece 96
Croatia 106
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) 119
Source: World Bank Doing Business Database 2008Economic Development in the Western Balkans
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Typically  a  relatively  large  number  of  procedures  are  required  to  register  a 
company, and the costs of registration are high. The time taken to register a 
company varies from 18 days in Serbia, where entrepreneurs can register online, 
to as many as 54 days in BiH. The cost of starting a business ranges from 7 per 
cent of income per capita in Macedonia and Montenegro to 37 per cent in BiH. 
The minimum capital required to start a business varies substantially, from zero 
in Montenegro to 112 per cent of per capita income in Macedonia. Taking all 
these factors together Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro are placed ahead of 
Serbia and Croatia in the World Bank 2008 ranking of the overall ease of starting 
a business, while BiH is placed at the lowest rank among the Western Balkan 
countries.
4. DISTORTED SPACES AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT CAPACITY
The introduction of market competition and privatisation in the Western Balkans 
has had mixed effects on social welfare. One of the more serious aspects of this is 
the growth of disparities in living standards and the quality of life on a territorial 
level. While some locations have prospered from the new opportunities presented 
by  the  opening  of  markets,  others  have  been  left  behind  and  have  suffered 
from adverse aspects of the restructuring and change which has accompanied 
transition such as deindustrialisation, outward migration of many young and 
skilled  people,  environmental  degradation,  and  the  deterioration  of  public 
services. As transition has proceeded, disparities between capital cities and other 
urban and rural areas have increased, while weak administrative capacities have 
prevented the implementation of effective local economic development policies 
to counteract these effects. FDI inflows and the growth of service industries have 
mainly benefited capital cities, while the decline of agriculture and older industrial 
centres have adversely affected other urban centres and rural areas. Damaged and 
decaying economic and social infrastructure has further weakened the ability of 
poorer localities to recover from economic decline and high unemployment. De-
industrialisation has created pockets of persistent poverty and social exclusion. 
Out-migration has depleted the skills base, which together with low levels of 
public expenditure on education has led to skills deficits, especially in rural areas. 
Consequently, there is limited endogenous capacity to stimulate local economic 
development in response to the adverse impacts of globalisation.
Recovery from deindustrialisation induced by privatisation has been easier in 
urban areas with basic infrastructure and a critical size of skilled labour force, 
while industrial regeneration based on high-technology industries and on business 40
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services has taken place if at all only in larger urban environments (Petrakos 
2001). Restructuring has led to declining shares of agriculture and industry and 
an increased share of services, including business services, banking, financial 
services,  entertainment  and  commerce.  These  services  have  grown  faster  in 
urban areas where economies of scale can be attained, and where transaction 
costs are lower due to physical proximity of customers. Larger urban areas, 
especially capital cities, have benefited more from the growth of such services, 
whereas peripheral rural areas have been left behind as few service industries have 
located there. Moreover, small and medium sized enterprises dominate in service 
industries, and are concentrated in urban areas due to agglomeration effects, 
especially in capital cities, and in secondary cities with specific comparative 
advantages. However, some types of services have a more even spatial spread, 
including  public  services  which  are  funded  by  central  government  such  as 
schools and hospitals, as well as some standardised private sector services such as 
retailing. Regions where inter-linkages between industries and firms are stronger 
also tend to be more attractive to service companies (Stare, 2005). This has been 
the case in Slovenia where the regional differences in employment and GDP have 
narrowed during the transition. In Western Balkan countries, in contrast, such 
inter-linkages between different industries and sectors are weaker, and regional 
inequalities have increased during the transition. A study of the quality of life in 
Croatia in 2006 found that equivalent household income was above average only 
in the capital city Zagreb and one other county (UNDP 2006). FDI also tends 
to generate a polarised pattern of development by concentrating in capital cities 
due to their better business infrastructure, telecommunications, international 
transport linkages, and larger pools of skilled workers. 
Recent  theories  of  local  economic  development  have  argued  that  economic 
development draws on local ‘endogenous’ resources, rather than on external 
demand or inflows of external resources, as in earlier ‘keynesian’ theories (Pike et 
al. 2007). In these new theories, institutions are held to have a strong influence over 
the pattern of local economic development. Much interest has been focused on 
informal institutions, policy networks, and inter-group relations which underpin 
trust between economic actors. High trust relations reduce transaction costs of 
doing business and thus promote local economic growth. Low trust environments 
increase the need for formal contracts, contract monitoring, and recourse to 
sometimes ineffective judicial systems, all of which increase the transaction costs 
of doing business. Institutional theories emphasise the local embeddedness of 
social relationships, and participative forms of local governance which support 
economic development. In order to mobilise local resources, institutions of local 
governance need to function effectively. Local stakeholders should be willing and Economic Development in the Western Balkans
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able to collaborate with one another in the pursuit of a common goal aimed at 
improving the quality of life in the locality. Where local institutions are relatively 
weak, the influence of external actors can be correspondingly great. In such a 
situation it is often difficult to build local political coalitions that can underpin 
and support processes of endogenous regional development. 
However, such institutions of local governance are weak in the Western Balkans 
and  there  are  few  examples  of  functioning  policy  networks  which  could 
mobilise endogenous development potential at a local level, outside the capital 
cities. Following the collapse of communism, most western Balkan countries 
have followed policy prescriptions to decentralise powers to local authorities. 
Activities such as education, health care, and water and electricity supply have 
been  transferred  to  the  competency  of  local  government.  Systems  of  local 
government that previously functioned relatively well have been broken up and 
replaced by more numerous smaller municipalities. In Macedonia for example, 
under a 1996 reform, the previous set of 34 municipalities that had functioned 
under  the  communist  system  was  replaced  with  123  smaller  municipalities 
(UNDP 2009). Under a further local government reform designed to increase 
the local representation of the minority communities, in particular the Albanian 
minority, these were again replaced by a system of 84 municipalities. In Bosnia 
and Herzegovina two large regions hold considerable devolved power, but this 
is wielded essentially along lines of ethnic division. Within each region local 
authorities are fragmented and atomised into small municipalities, hindering the 
mobilisation of local resources. Throughout the region, most local municipalities 
are unprepared or unable to take on their increased responsibilities for economic 
development and service delivery due to their very weak administrative capacity. 
5. CONCLUSIONS
This  paper  has  assessed  the  evidence  on  the  impact  of  globalisation  on  the 
economies of the Western Balkans. It has argued that the region has largely 
failed to benefit from the advantages of the globalisation process, while it has 
simultaneously suffered from its main defects. The wars and conflicts that afflicted 
the region in the 1990s have pushed the countries into the European ‘super-
periphery’. Deindustrialisation has destroyed jobs and led to high concentrations of 
unemployment in the most deprived areas and consequently there is a widespread 
incidence of poverty. Integration into global markets has been disrupted, leading 
to chronic balance of payments deficits, while low inflows of FDI due to high 
country risk have hindered technological catch-up and weakened international 42
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competitiveness.  Infrastructure  is  decayed  and  underdeveloped,  and  public 
services such as education and health care are underprovided. Incomes are low 
and households depend heavily on remittance income from family members 
working abroad. Inflows of international aid from donor organisations and the 
EU have led to a strong, but contradictory, influence of international actors have 
had on policy making for economic development. Capital resources for local 
economic development are scarce, despite efforts to improve matters by donor-
funded micro-credit schemes, while local administrative capacities are too weak 
to effectively benefit from decentralisation policies. All these issues have been 
exacerbated by the destructive effects of the current global economic crisis which 
is having a further deleterious effect on these economies as export revenues, 
labour remittances, and inflows of FDI have all diminished, financial capital 
has been pulled out of the region, growth has slowed, and unemployment has 
increased further. 
The eventual EU accession of the Western Balkan countries would enable the 
region to overcome some of these negative effects of exclusion from the process of 
globalisation. The East European economies that joined the EU in 2004 benefitted 
from increased inflows of FDI, increased trade within the EU market, and a greater 
opportunity for local businesses to engage in international supply networks and 
upgrade their low technological level, in addition to benefitting directly from 
EU structural funds and other Community programmes. In the current global 
economic crisis some of these factors are being thrown into reverse, as capital 
is being repatriated from the Periphery to the Centre. Taking just one example, 
in March 2009, Renault closed down a production line in Slovenia and moved 
it back to Paris, destroying 400 jobs in Slovenia and creating 400 jobs in France 
in the process. EU membership is therefore certainly no panacea. However, the 
countries of the super-periphery, in the Western Balkans and elsewhere, are even 
more vulnerable to such practices than the EU New Member States. Therefore, a 
faster process of EU accession is badly needed in the Western Balkans. Without 
a faster process of accession to the EU, local disparities are likely to widen, and 
the region as a whole will remain within the European super-periphery for the 
foreseeable future.
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